Latvia's democratic resistance: a forgotten episode from the Second World War by Swain, G.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Swain, G. (2009) Latvia's democratic resistance: a forgotten episode 
from the Second World War. European History Quarterly, 39 (2). pp. 241-
263. ISSN 0265-6914 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/6222/ 
 
Deposited on: 23 June 2009 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
Geoffrey Swain 
 
“Latvia’s Democratic Resistance: a Forgotten Episode from the Second 
World War”,  European History Quarterly,  no 2, 2009. 
 
Abstract 
In summer 1943 politicians representing the four main political parties of Latvia's 
democratic years came together to establish a movement which would both resist 
the German occupation and prevent the return of the Red Army. They considered the 
key to re-establishing Latvia as an independent democratic state was to make 
contact with Britain, and they hoped to do this by a combination of military and 
diplomatic activity. Once contact with Sweden had been established this Latvian 
Central Council planned to combine a diplomatic offensive abroad with an 
insurrection within Latvia. The diplomatic offensive was partly obstructed by the 
Foreign Office, but that did not prevent the Latvian Central Council working closely 
with the British Secret Service as it first brought out of Latvia potential members of a 
Government in Exile, and then began to prepare for an insurrection. Planned to 
coincide with the arrival of the Red Army and the withdrawal of the Germans, the 
military wing of the Latvian Central Council intended to seize part of the Courland 
coast and hold it until British or Swedish forces intervened to prevent them being 
crushed by the Red Army, thus forcing the Soviets to negotiate about the future 
status of Latvia. The plans of the Latvian Central Council relied heavily on stories 
circulating in Sweden that the British were indeed about to intervene in the Baltic, 
and it is argued here that there was more to this than mere loose talk. The dilemma 
of whether or not to stage an insurrection was resolved by the Germans, who 
arrested General Kurelis, the leader of the insurrection and the man designated the 
interim leader of independent Latvia. The surviving forces of the Latvian Central 
Council established themselves as an underground army and waited for news from 
Britain that the time had come to rise. When no such message had come by summer 
1945, many underground groups started moves towards a national uprising; to 
prevent this the Latvian Central Council used its surviving organization to instruct its 
underground fighters not to take up arms against the Soviets but to wait on 
diplomacy.  
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On 19 January 1945 the careful reader of The Times would have noticed a short article 
from its special correspondent in Stockholm bearing the title “Latvian Patriots Shot”. The 
article explained that “the German military authorities in Courland (Kurzeme) have shot 
five Latvian patriot officers, members of the Latvian ‘underground army’…whom the 
Germans took prisoner after a stiff battle in which it is credibly reported the Germans 
lost 300 killed”. As the article went on to state, “the body to which the above victims 
belonged, nominally headed by the elderly Latvian General Kurelis, is not serving the 
Russians, but is simply a well-armed and organised group of Latvian patriots now living 
in the forests of the Windau (Ventspils)-Talsi area, which also harbours partisans 
working for the Russians; by an explicit understanding these organizations operate 
separately, keeping to roughly defined areas, but both fight and harass the Germans 
whenever they can”. Among the five officers shot was a certain Captain Upelnieks. 
 This brief report is one of the few contemporary references to an attempt made 
by Latvian democrats towards the end of 1944 to emulate the Warsaw Uprising and 
fight against both the German occupiers and the returning Red Army. The Times story 
reflects almost word for word information sent by radio in mid November 1944 from 
Latvia by supporters of General Jānis Kurelis to an organization based in Sweden known 
as the Foreign Delegation of the Latvian Central Council.1 It is the Latvian Central 
Council (Latvijas Centrālās Padomes, henceforth LCP) which is the subject of this study. 
The history of the twentieth century has left Latvians with a poor reputation. Their 
participation in the Nazi mass killings of Jews in 1941-42 is often remembered, while 
others recall how Latvians rose to the very top of the Soviet secret police.2 Yet there is 
also another story to tell and this article focuses on those Latvians who, during the last 
two years of the Second World War, sought the support of Britain in re-establishing 
Latvia as an independent and democratic state. The LCP’s story is almost unknown 
outside Latvia, and even within that country its activities are often misunderstood. 
 
Establishing Latvia’s Democratic Resistance 
 
The LCP can trace its origins to democratic politicians who tried to resist the 
sovietization of their country in 1940-1941. Their efforts were concentrated among 
students and staff at the University of Latvia in Riga. Professor Konstantīns Čakste, the 
son of Latvia’s first president, became the focal point for their activities and among 
those who took part were students such as Artūrs Arnītis, Oskars Bīleskalns, Valentīna 
Jaunzeme and Leonīds Siliņš; the young army officer, Captain Kristaps Upelnieks was 
also a member. When the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union began on 22 June 1941, 
Upelnieks was one of those who took to the forests around Skrīveri and Pļaviņas to 
establish irregular Latvian self-defence units which harried the retreating Red Army; all 
such independent units were quickly dissolved by the Nazis.3 Members of this 
democratic opposition began to regroup in 1942, a process accelerated by the re-
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establishment of the underground organization of the Latvian Social Democratic Party in 
February that year.  
 In June 1940 the Social Democrats had been uncertain how to respond to Soviet 
military occupation of Latvia. Many accepted at face value Soviet talk of a new popular 
front government to resist the danger of fascism; after all, Soviet intervention had led to 
the overthrow of the authoritarian regime of Kārlis Ulmanis, who had come to power in 
a coup in May 1934 and had immediately banned all political parties and suspended 
parliament. Bruno Kalniņš, leader of the Workers’ Sports and Guards organization who 
had been imprisoned by Ulmanis and later went into exile in Finland, was at first willing 
to accept the post of Political Commissar in the Latvian “People’s” Army, a post from 
which he was removed once the annexation of Latvia into the Soviet Union was 
complete. When the Social Democratic Party re-established its underground organization 
in February 1942 it was determined to have no more dealings with the communists and 
to build up an alliance only with other democratic politicians. By the end of 1942 Latvia’s 
democrat politicians, again grouped around Čakste, had established a network of some 
300 resisters with bases not only in Riga but also Liepāja, Jelgava and Ventspils. Among 
the movement’s early and prominent adherents were Čakste’s brother, Mintauts, a 
former member of Latvia’s senate; Dr Voldemars Ģinters, an eminent archaeologist in 
charge of Riga’s historical museum; Professor Arnolds Aizsilnieks, a distinguished 
economics professor at Latvia University; and Ludvigs Sēja, a former ambassador and 
foreign minister.4 It was the Social Democrats and the democrats, more particularly 
Kalniņš and Čakste, who took the lead in forming the LCP, and gathered around them 
representatives from the Peasant Union, Ādolfs Klīve, and the Latgale Christian Party, 
Catholic Bishop of Riga Jāzeps Rancāns5 - Bishop Rancāns had served as deputy speaker 
in the last three of Latvia’s democratically elected parliaments.  
 Early in 1943 the question of contacting Latvian émigrés in neutral Sweden 
began to be discussed; through them contact could be made with Allied representatives 
in the West. In January 1943 Bīleskalns met up with his old student friend Arnītis, and 
another sympathetic former student Voldemārs Mežaks.6 All three were living in the port 
of Ventspils, and in spring 1943 Siliņš travelled from Riga to Ventspils to meet them. 
Arnītis worked as a construction engineer in Ventspils port, and Siliņš wanted to know if 
there was any way to escape from Latvia to Sweden by boat. Nothing came of this first 
approach, but in the summer Siliņš successfully travelled to Sweden on a fishing boat 
organized by Arnītis.7 Siliņš arrived in Sweden on 22 July 1943. He was Čakste’s 
authorized emissary and when he reached Stockholm on 29 July he rang his designated 
contact Jānis Tepfers.8 Another leading figure within the LCP was General Verners 
Tepfers, whose brother Jānis had been the Latvian ambassador to Finland and then 
moved to Sweden in 1942 to work as a translator in the Swedish Foreign Ministry. In 
Sweden Jānis Tepfers was in close contact with Voldemārs Salnais, the Latvian 
ambassador to Sweden, who in turn was in regular contact with Kārlis Zariņš, the 
Latvian ambassador to London.  
 As soon as Arnītis received confirmation that Siliņš had arrived safely, he 
travelled to Riga to inform Čakste of the news. Then Latvia’s democratic politicians held 
a meeting formally to establish the LCP. On 12 August Čakste, Kalniņš, Bishop Rancāns 
and Klīve met at Klīve’s flat and chose Čakste as president and Kalniņš vice president of 
the new organization.9 At this historic meeting, Kalniņš read out a programme which had 
been agreed earlier and contained fourteen points summarizing the need for a single 
resistance movement against the German occupation which would bring together 
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Latvia’s four big parliamentary parties into a common front to work for the renewal of a 
democratic Latvia. The programme made clear that Latvia’s new democracy should 
avoid some of the failings of the inter-war years; the powers of the president would be 
strengthened and the terms of parliaments lengthened. The LCP, while working 
according to the strictest principles of conspiracy, would oppose all German actions 
contrary to the Hague Convention, such as forced mobilization to the Latvian Legion; 
disassociate itself from all activities by the communist resistance; and develop its work 
through diplomatic links with Great Britain and the USA. At the end of this historic 
meeting, the LCP resolved to meet again in two weeks time in the flat of Bishop 
Rancāns. 
 The arrival of Siliņš in Stockholm and his reports on the activities of Latvia’s 
democratic resistance caused an immediate stir, both among the Stockholm emigration 
and Latvians further afield. At this stage, the main channel of communication between 
the Latvian Legations in Sweden and London was via Polish embassy couriers, and on 3 
August Salnais used these contacts to report to Zariņš the arrival of Siliņš; he stressed 
that although Siliņš was not known to the émigré group in Stockholm, it was clear that 
the group he represented were part of the Latvian intelligentsia and were active and 
skilled in conspiratorial work; Salnais and Siliņš were soon discussing the possibility of 
launching an underground newspaper in Latvia, as a letter sent by Salnais to Zariņš a 
fortnight later reveals.10 Siliņš’s arrival must also have been reported to Alexander 
“Sandy” McKibbin, an MI6 representative in Stockholm. Salnais, Zariņš and McKibbin had 
been in discussion for some time about the fate of Latvian sailors in Sweden and the 
possibility of their transfer to Britain for service in the Royal Navy; this was a matter 
fraught with diplomatic sensitivities, but McKibbin had been, and would continue to 
remain unswervingly optimistic. Indeed on 15 November 1943 Salnais informed Zariņš 
that “Sandy” had made Baltic affairs his own, supporting the Baltic emigration in its 
difficulties and rejoicing in its successes.11 The MI6 station chief in Stockholm, Harry 
Carr, shared this interest. He had set in motion a programme of interviewing all those 
who escaped from the Baltic States to Sweden, and it is inconceivable that Siliņš was not 
one of those so interviewed.12  
 Salnais was quick to identify with the work of the LCP. On 3 September he wrote 
a long report for transmission to Riga, promising to give all the support he could and 
urging the LCP to establish itself as a solid underground organization, capable of 
initiating both legal and illegal activities. Ten days later Salnais wrote to Zariņš 
describing his “heart to heart” talks with Siliņš, the respect and trust he had for him; 
Salnais considered Siliņš his de facto secretary.13 Towards the end of October Salnais 
and Siliņš began work on establishing a Swedish-Latvian Aid Committee (Svensk-lettiska 
hjälpkommit én), to provide aid for the growing number of Latvian refugees. Salnais 
reported to Zariņš on 22 December 1943 that it had finally been established with a 
former Latvian consul Johan Sande as President and Siliņš as Secretary. Funds for the 
Committee’s work were soon provided from the Americans: on 22 January 1944 
President Roosevelt freed money from the War Refugee Board to be used to bring over 
those fleeing from conscription to the German Army, the Latvian intelligentsia and 
western oriented politicians, escaping Jews and deserters from the German armed 
forces. With a grant of 70,000 kronor (approximately 17,000 dollars), Siliņš was 
immediately given the task of contacting Latvia and starting the process of evacuation.
t
14
 
Diplomacy Abroad 
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In order to establish closer relations with the western allies, the LCP decided to establish 
a Foreign Delegation. Čakste wrote about this to Siliņš on 10 January 1944  and soon 
the membership had been agreed: Pauls Kalniņš, the father of Bruno and the former 
parliamentary speaker, was appointed president in absentia; Salnais became vice-
president and Siliņš secretary; Jānis Tepfers was an ordinary member, as was Fēlikss 
Cielēns (in absentia), a Social Democrat parliamentary deputy who had served as 
Latvia’s Foreign Minister and ambassador to France. On 26 February Čakste wrote to 
Siliņš again, confirming Siliņš as both Secretary of the Foreign Delegation and LCP 
representative in Stockholm.15 The establishment of the Foreign Delegation prompted 
the LCP to make a determined effort to send a delegation to London. Čakste wrote to 
Salnais on 26 February 1944 asking him to request from Zariņš diplomatic passports for 
Siliņš and other members of the Foreign Delegation: that such a delegation would 
request military assistance is clear from the discussion in the letter of the need to 
establish military missions. Čakste made clear that foreign intervention in Latvia on the 
part of democratic states would be welcome: “here there would be no objection if US or 
British military forces came to Latvia, that would even be desired very much – or even 
the armed forces of a neutral power like Sweden, for example; the local population 
would support such an occupation actively”. He added that, while arms available to the 
Latvians at the moment were modest, once German troops surrendered substantial arms 
would be obtained; even before the German surrender, the LCP expected that sufficient 
arms for 180,000 men could be obtained from Finland.16  
 A month later, on 31 March 1944, Salnais explained to Čakste how unreal these 
expectations were. The Lend-lease scheme for supporting allies of the western 
democracies was simply not available to a group like the LCP; even basic financial 
support was not available, for Zariņš had tried to persuade the British Treasury to 
“unblock” some of pre-war Latvia’s funds held in the Bank of England, but had been 
turned down.17 As to the diplomatic passports, this had already led to problems in 
London. On 18 September 1943 Siliņš had written to Zariņš requesting help in obtaining 
a diplomatic passport so that he could visit London. When Zariņš replied on 4 October 
his tone was one of offence at Siliņš’s failure to understand the diplomatic realities of life 
in London. He copied his reply to Salnais and from this it is clear that, although Zariņš 
stressed he was not insulted by such a direct approach from someone he did not even 
know, nevertheless the request had put him in a difficult and even ridiculous situation; it 
had been hard enough to make progress on the fate of the Latvian sailors, the British 
would certainly not grant Siliņš a passport. Siliņš needed to remember that Zariņš had 
no diplomatic immunity.18  
 Zariņš ended his letter by adding that in forwarding this request Salnais had 
potentially compromised his position as a non-party ambassador. This criticism seems to 
have reflected worries Zariņš had about the constitutional plans of the LCP. Prior to the 
Soviet occupation of June 1940 Ulmanis had given Zariņš extraordinary powers to act in 
the interests of Latvia’s statehood if its sovereignty were impaired. Although Salnais had 
tried to reassure Zariņš that the issue of the constitution was not so acute at home as it 
seemed to be abroad, Zariņš was not yet ready to back the LCP. On 1 February 1944 he 
sent Foreign Minister Eden a statement which called for the establishment of an 
International Committee to administer Latvia after the war, with “any trials of war 
criminals which may affect Latvian citizens being postponed until the end of the war.”19 
This statement made no mention of the LCP. Zariņš was perturbed by the question of 
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authority: did the LCP have sufficient representative authority to demand the obedience 
of the diplomatic corps and were its plans for Latvia’s future acceptable to all? On 23 
March 1944 he had written to Salnais suggesting that the first task was to free the 
Latvian people and then consult them on their future form of government, rather than to 
decide questions of state administration in advance.  
 The LCP’s statements were confused on the question of the constitution. The 
Programme adopted in August 1943 mentioned addressing the weakness of the previous 
parliamentary system, but the Declaration issued to the diplomats abroad talked of 
restoring “the organs of government envisaged by the constitution”.20 By spring 1944 
LCP documents talked of the demand for “a new parliament and a new constitution” 
which would limit the impact of the previous system of proportional representation.21 
These rather different statements reflected the fact that while there was broad 
agreement among the four parties in the LCP about the need to address the failings of 
the pre-Ulmanis constitution, a dispute had arisen on the LCP’s judicial commission 
between the Peasant’s Union and the Social Democrats over whether or not to expand 
the powers of the president.22 It was perhaps because these issues were finally being 
cleared up that, on 28 March 1944, Zariņš informed the Foreign Office officially of the 
establishment of the LCP; a public declaration was made at the Latvian Legation in 
London on 14 April 1944.23 Yet a few days later, Zariņš could still complain to Salnais 
about the way the LCP operated without consultation, issuing what amounted to orders 
to its diplomats, implying that the LCP were state leaders when in fact their mandate 
was unclear.24  
 Understandably given the tension between Zariņš and Salnais, Čakste was keen 
to strengthen the Foreign Delegation. He informed Siliņš on 25 April that Cielēns should 
arrive in the middle of May25, and amongst the material he brought to Stockholm was a 
letter from Pauls Kalniņš to be sent to the governments of Great Britain and the United 
States. Zariņš duly passed it to the Foreign Office on 7 June 1944. In the letter Kalniņš 
asserted that, as “speaker of the last democratically and lawfully elected parliament of 
Latvia” he was assuming the position of President of the Republic, in accordance with 
the constitution. The letter made clear that “under the German occupation the functions 
of the Government in Latvia are assumed, and national resistance directed, by the 
Central Council of Latvia in which all the main political currents are represented”. No 
doubt aware of the diplomatic problems the distribution of this letter might cause him, 
Zariņš stated in covering letter that in the present circumstances Kalniņš had “no 
effective power”.26 Cielēns followed up the Kalniņš letter with a detailed report on the 
LCP and its activities27, while a further report, sent from Stockholm on 5 July, finally 
cleared up the confusion about the LCP’s constitutional plans. This stated: “The new 
constitution of the new Latvian state is, however, not intended to be a mechanical copy 
of the old constitution of 1922; the idea is to maintain only the general democratic 
principles of the old constitution and to create something new and better as regards the 
authority of government organs.” All political circles, the statement went on, were 
agreed on the necessity to end proportional representation and encourage the 
emergence of three main parties; to strengthen the powers of the president and the 
government; and to introduce longer parliaments.28
 The Kalniņš letter made clear that the LCP was on the point of announcing the 
formation of a new democratic government. Correspondence between Zariņš and the 
Foreign Office also shows that at the end of July there was discussion about the 
circumstances in which a new Latvian government might be recognized. As Zariņš 
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explained to the Foreign Office, it had been agreed on the eve of the Soviet occupation 
of June 1940 that only the Latvian ambassador to the United States, Alfrēds Bīlmanis, 
had the authority to recognize the formation of a newly independent Latvian 
Government.29 However, Bīlmanis showed no enthusiasm for the LCP. On 8 July he 
informed Washington that he did not know the identities of LCP members and did not 
accept the letter from Kalniņš as “having an official character” since it was not signed. 
This attitude of Bīlmanis seems to have prevented any announcement about the 
formation of a new government at this stage30, although there was a clear logic to the 
idea of declaring the formation of a new democratic government as the Red Army 
crossed on to Latvian territory on 19 July 1944. 
 
Resistance at home 
 
The LCP was not only active abroad, but also very active within Latvia itself. Members of 
the organization engaged in such acts of sabotage as burning flour mills, and in January 
1944 they destroyed the main grain elevator for Riga harbour. At the same time groups 
of nationalist partisans were beginning to be formed in the forests.31 In February 1944 
the LCP claimed that it headed a single underground organization of partisans which 
embraced the whole land.32 Little trace of the activities of these groups has been left to 
historians, but evidence to support the claim can be found. One of the leading figures 
among Latvia’s pro-Soviet partisans Vilis Samsons recalled that in late 1943 talks took 
place with ‘liberally minded armed nationalist groups’ in Alūksne, Kārsava, Ludza and 
Cibla, while another Soviet partisan commander Vilhelms Laiviņš held talks with 
nationalist partisans in Valka; a third Soviet partisan commander Otomārs Oškalns met 
nationalist partisans near Birzgale in November 1943 and spring 1944. Reports from 
Soviet partisans to Moscow in January and February 1944 expressed concern at the 
growing number of nationalist partisan groups operating in Latgale. Partisans loyal to 
the LCP were a genuine force, but to the frustration of the Soviet partisans they were 
under strict orders not to engage in any political deals, although they did engage in joint 
action from time to time. 33   
 Clandestine activity was not the only sphere of LCP work. To challenge the right 
of the German puppet Self-Administration (Landeseigene Verwaltung) to impose 
conscription to the Latvian Legion the LCP organized in March 1944 a campaign among 
the pillars of pre-war Latvian society to collect signatures for a petition demanding the 
restoration of a democratic, independent republic and asserting that only an 
independent Latvian Government, properly constituted, could mobilize the nation. This 
petition, which collected 189 signatures and was later sent to the west, was largely the 
work of Cielēns, who was disappointed not to have obtained the signature of Alberts 
Kveisis, Latvia’s surviving democratically elected president.34 The petition campaign was 
reinforced by a letter Zariņš had sent the LCP via Salnais which made clear that, 
according to the briefing he had been given by the Ulmanis Government on the eve of 
the Soviet Union’s military intervention of June 1940, war – and by extension 
mobilization – could only be declared by the legal government of Latvia, which the 
German-appointed administration could not claim to be.35  
 The problems the LCP faced in its London work were not matched in the 
resistance work organized from Stockholm. There, from early in 1944 the LCP was in 
close contact with the British Secret Service; at that time the LCP was given permission 
to communicate with London through the diplomatic bag, thus ending the link with the 
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Polish Government in Exile. Of course, the Secret Service wanted something in return, 
and the LCP was expected to provide intelligence information about the military situation 
in German-occupied Latvia.36 To obtain that information the LCP would need to send 
regular agents to Latvia and this coincided with its plans to evacuate to Sweden leading 
democratic politicians. In February 1944 Siliņš was issued with “an English radio”.37 
When he set off for the Kurzeme coast that month, in a boat helmed by a new recruit to 
the LCP Eduards Andersons, he took this radio with him. Siliņš was also in touch with 
Swedish military intelligence, also anxious to monitor the situation on the Baltic coast. 38 
Siliņš went straight to Čakste in Riga and asked for “the English radio” to be passed to 
Captain Upelnieks; back in Ventspils he made contact once again with Arnitis. His 
message to both Čakste and Arnītis was the same: it was now the duty of the LCP to 
organize active resistance to the Germans in order to convince public opinion abroad 
that the Latvians were actively fighting for their independence.39
 LCP boat crews then began to maintain regular contact between Swedish 
Gotland and Kurzeme. Andersons made the journey in March, April and May, contacting 
not only Arnītis but another LCP activist Alfonss Priedītis; despite these regular sailings, 
Čakste  expressed concern on 1 April 1944 that Siliņš was not responding to his 
questions, even though regular sailings continued into May.40 However, by then the 
work of the LCP had been interrupted by the Gestapo. On 27 April 1944 an LCP courier 
was arrested, leading to the arrest of Čakste on the 29th. Ludvigs Sēja, the LCP 
Secretary, was arrested a month later on 25 May, leaving Bruno Kalniņš to head the 
organization.41 Nor were arrests the only problems the LCP faced in its work; their radios 
turned out to be extremely unreliable. Siliņš returned to Kurzeme later in May, and spent 
two weeks working underground, accompanied by Arnītis. When he returned to Sweden 
he left Andersons in Kurzeme with Arnītis, but radio communication was never properly 
established.42  Arnītis and Andersons were hardly back in Sweden when, early in June 
Siliņš again asked them to travel back with new radios and new codes. They made 
successful contact with Priedītis and transferred the new equipment, but there was no 
immediate improvement – since the radios only had a range of 150 miles they were 
constantly operating at the margins of reliability.43
 The approach of the Red Army caused underground activity within Latvia to 
intensify. With the LCP’s diplomatic offensive stalled, it was time to put the LCP’s 
underground operations on a firmer military footing. As a prerequisite, radio contact had 
to be secured. Siliņš was determined to return to Latvia himself, taking with him the 
best radio operator he could find. He recruited Richards Zande, who before leaving for 
Kurzeme was trained by Swedish Intelligence on the use of Swedish radios, and then 
privately by Siliņš on the importance of “the English radio”. Siliņš and Zande, 
accompanied by another LCP activist Pēteris Klibiķis, with whom Zande had escaped to 
Sweden earlier in the year, set off on 12 July and arrived in Kurzeme on the 13th. They 
were joined on the 14th by Prieditis and on the 15th by Arnītis and Andersons, who 
explained the continuing difficulties with the radios. Two days later Upelnieks arrived 
and the LCP held a council of war. Upelnieks brought bad news; Bruno Kalniņš had been 
arrested by the Gestapo, and replaced as LCP leader by General Verners Tepfers. 
Nevertheless Upelnieks and Siliņš agreed that Zande and Klibikis should travel to Riga to 
make contact with Valentīna Jaunzeme, who would take them to Upelnieks’s house to 
work first on the radio transmitter hidden there. Zande succeeded in restoring “the 
English radio” and then returned to Ventspils to work on restoring the other LCP 
radios.44 For a while after this, radio communications between Sweden and Kurzeme 
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went smoothly, with transmissions being received in Sweden from such places as far 
afield as Skrīveri, Mazsalaca and Dundaga.45 
 
Uprising 
 
During this July visit Siliņš travelled to Jelgava and from there on to Riga for talks with 
Tepfers. It was here that he tried to advance the LCP’s military plans. At this second 
council of war Siliņš stressed the importance of the nationalist underground becoming 
more active. Under Soviet interrogation, Arnītis would later describe Siliņš’s address to 
the council of war using the following words: “England and the US had to be shown that 
the Latvian people were not oriented towards Germany, and did not want a Soviet 
Latvia; that it was necessary to stage an uprising and hold out, even if it was only for a 
week. During that time it was possible to hope for help from England and in this way 
bring reality to the final aim the organisation had always set itself, the creation of an 
independent Latvia.” To realize this plan, armed forces were needed. Another of those 
present at the meeting later told Soviet interrogators: it was “early in July” that Siliņš 
began to talk of the need for an uprising; the appointment of Upelnieks as chief of staff 
to General Kurelis provided the perfect way forward.46   
 
Contact between the LCP and General Kurelis was indeed the key to the organization’s 
military ambitions. It was on this visit that Upelnieks and Siliņš, accompanied by Zande 
and Prieditis, first established contact with General Kurelis. Kurelis had served with the 
Fifth Zemgale Regiment of Latvian Riflemen of the Russian Imperial Army during World 
War One, and then in the Latvian Army, being appointed a general in 1925. He retired in 
1940, but at the end of 1943, when the German occupation authorities permitted the re-
formation of the inter-war paramilitary nationalist militia the aizsa gi, Kurelis joined the 
Fifth Riga Aizsargi Regiment.
r
47 By 28 July Kurelis had 1,800 men under his command, 
based initially at Skrīveri, and his group’s official tasks were: 1) to defend the Daugava 
Pļaviņas Kegums region; 2) to deliver 200 armed men to send to Riga. The daybook of 
the Kurelis Group shows that in mid August it was in action near Jēkabpils, Koknese, 
Aizkraukle and Pļaviņas. However, his biggest operation came after Tukums fell to the 
Red Army on 30 July; Kurelis played a key role in the recapture of the town on 20 
August. Kurelis was also in radio contact with his supporters in Vidzeme and Latgale; on 
9 September he received a radio message from Rēzekne, from national partisans 
operating behind the lines.48 As the Soviet partisan commander Oškalns testified, these 
national partisans believed in the imminent arrival of British military intervention and 
read the underground newspaper Jaunā Latvija (New Latvia) edited by Cielēns.49
 Boasting from Stockholm of the key role played by Latvian forces at the battle for 
Tukums, Cielēns stressed that “Latvian officers believe that if the Latvians had sufficient 
modern weapons (tanks, anti-aircraft guns, artillery and airplanes) and ammunition at 
their disposal, a Latvian Army of 150,000 men could be set up immediately; this army 
would be in a position to defend Latvia against the Russians for some time”. He went 
on:  
 
Patriotic Latvians have seized the idea of partisan combat…Psychologically the 
Latvians cling to their last hope – that the Americans and English will soon defeat 
in a couple of months Hitler Germany and will then defend the lofty principles of 
the Atlantic Charter against the Russians. The people must fight and suffer for a 
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few months. Soon deliverance will come form the great Western democracies 
which saved Europe and the Baltic peoples in 1918.50
 
Although by the end of July 1944 General Kurelis was fully integrated into the LCP’s 
Military Department, with his units ready to act as soon as the struggle began, not all 
the LCP leaders were as convinced of the need for immediate military action as Siliņš or 
Cielēns. The situation at that time was very fluid. Not only was the German Army 
retreating, but the attempt on Hitler’s life of 20 July prompted a wave of uncertainty and 
indecision among the Latvian occupation authorities. Kurelis and the LCP had 
sympathizers within the Self-Administration and the Latvian Legion - attempts had been 
made to contact them before embarking on the March 1944 petition51 - and on 17 
August Čakste, Bruno Kalniņš, and Sēja wrote to Tepfers from prison urging him to take 
one last political initiative. He should head a delegation including Pauls Kalniņš and 
Bishop Rancāns which would request a formal meeting with the General Inspector of the 
Latvian Legion SS-Gruppenführer Rūdolfs Banģerskis; private approaches suggested the 
Legion’s leadership might be ready to break with the Germans.52  
 When nothing came of this approach, Kurelis and Upelnieks began to explore the 
military possibilities before them. It is clear that the expectation of foreign support 
remained strong, although the idea of obtaining weapons from Finland had to be 
abandoned after Finland called for a cease-fire on 4 September and signed an armistice 
with the Soviet Union on the 19th, news that was immediately communicated to 
Kurelis.53 Nevertheless, as Zande’s radio informed Sweden on behalf of Upelnieks, the 
Kurelis group saw itself as “tasked, with the help of the English and Swedish, to drive 
the Germans from Latvia and not allowing in the Bolsheviks, to re-establish an 
independent Latvia”. As Zande later told Soviet interrogators, “the nationalists were 
counting on an English and Swedish landing” and therefore sent information about 
coastal defences.54 The LCP believed that the German Army would not cling on to the 
Kurzeme peninsula. Thus, while for the immediate future it made sense to continue to 
oppose the Red Army alongside the German Army, at the first sign that the Germans 
were leaving Kurzeme, Kurelis would act. This plan was agreed in September 1944 when 
Arnītis made another sea crossing, bringing with him once again a new radio. He went 
straight to Riga for talks with General Tepfers in which it was agreed that Tepfers should 
leave for Sweden along with Mintauts Čakste and Pauls Kalniņš. Before leaving Tepfers 
appointed Voldemārs Ģinters his successor and carefully briefed him on the state of LCP 
planning. He instructed Ģinters to maintain contact with Kurelis and help the general 
stage an insurrection with both his own units and those sympathetic to him within the 
Latvian Legion. The plan remained essentially this, as Arnītis later told Soviet 
interrogators, to seize territory on the Baltic coast and proclaim the re-birth of an 
independent Latvia in anticipation of support from Britain.55  
 As these planes were being finalized, on 9 September the LCP bit the bullet and 
announced the renewal of the Latvian state. According to Cielēns, it had planned to do 
this on 1 August56, but constitutional niceties got in the way. However, the last 
constitutionally elected President of Latvia, Alberts Kveisis, died on 9 August 1944 and 
this meant that when the last meeting of the LCP was held on Latvian soil in the flat of 
Bishop Rancāns, there were no impediments to Pauls Kalniņš making use of his powers 
as parliamentary speaker to issue the requisite formal announcement. This meeting was 
attended by Upelnieks, who represented Kurelis, and by Mintauts Čakste. The Germans 
responded on 22 September by arresting Bishop Rancāns.57
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Disintegration 
 
As the time for action approached, Kurelis was keen to clarify just what support he 
would get. LCP radio communications with Sweden on 12 and 13 September show that 
Kurelis was worried about the extent of military support he would get from abroad and 
whether the International Red Cross would recognize him.58 Between 16-22 September 
the situation at the front forced Kurelis to relocate his forces to the Talsi region.59 
However, once at his new base he became concerned at the attitude of the British. After 
a meeting organized by Upelnieks on 10 October, Kurelis clashed with the LCP Foreign 
Delegation in Sweden over the question of providing military intelligence to the British, 
intelligence which he feared would be shared with the Red Army.60 The message 
Upelnieks sent after that meeting read: “we will give no information of a military 
character if that information is used by the British or answers their interests; if the 
English can stop the Russians coming, then the information can be given – we are not 
going to allow our throats to be cut”.61  
 This episode did not delay preparations for long. Kurelis communicated his 
assent to the LCP leadership on 14 October62 and on 29 October he moved his 
headquarters from Talsi to Ventspils.63 At precisely this time, one of Kurelis’s chief liaison 
officers, Indulis Dišlers, was contacted by Valentīna Jaunzeme, whom Ģinters had put in 
charge of military matters. Her message was that things were now falling into place and 
the insurrection should begin soon: all the key members of Latvia’s planned future 
democratic government were now abroad -Mintauts Cakste had left on 15 October and 
Tepfers arrived in Sweden on 1 November64 - and at the same time the English Secret 
Service were offering help; the time had therefore come for Kurelis to declare himself 
Provisional President and Minister of War and begin the insurrection. However, the 
message she brought about the English Secret Service was rather confusing. She 
reported that on 25 October 1944 “Lonis”, the code name for Siliņš, had held a meeting 
with “the leader of the English Secret Service in Stockholm” and had been informed that 
“England would offer help to the LCP in April-May 1945 in the event that the English 
fleet found itself in the Baltic Sea and the Germans were still in the Kurzeme peninsula.65 
This was a long way from a clear promise of support for an immediate insurrection. 
When Upelnieks reported this back to Kurelis on 1 November, he was both optimistic 
and pessimistic, referring darkly to “being caught on this fish-hook many times”.66
 The LCP strategy was premised on the Germans commencing a withdrawal from 
the Kurzeme peninsula in the near future; the British message seemed to suggest aid 
would only come if the Germans stayed on in Kurzeme until spring 1945. It is therefore 
not surprising that at this time Kurelis vented some frustration on another of his LCP 
liaison officers, Pēteris Klibiķis. According to what Klibiķis later told Soviet interrogators, 
Kurelis was worried that the Germans had already found out about his plans and that 
talk of delay until spring 1945 was unrealistic: “we have to act in the near future, either 
to take the path of an armed action for the declaration and creation of an independent 
Latvia, or its armed forces must go over to an illegal stance and hide in the forests in 
small groups”. Kurelis wanted to receive a clear answer from the LCP leadership in 
Sweden as to which of these policies to follow, and in the event of armed action he 
again raised the issue of establishing contact with the International Red Cross.67  
 Jaunzeme described the reply she received from Sweden on these points as 
“hopelessly vague”, and made preparations herself to leave for Sweden, presumably to 
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clarify the situation.68 The last radio message from Sweden to Latvia in November 1944 
was indeed rather unhelpful. It stated: “The English representative gave instructions to 
hold Kurzeme only at the moment when the British and American fleet arrived in the 
Baltic Sea. The arrival time in the Baltic Sea has not been determined. Depending on 
circumstances and the forces at your disposal, do what you can. If local conditions 
allow, you should declare the re-establishment of the sovereignty of the Latvian state. If 
the LCP with you does not establish a Provisional Government which will issue the 
declaration, then Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces General K should issue it, 
and temporarily, until the formation of a provisional government, assume all military and 
civilian powers. In this case the composition of the Provisional Government will be 
declared later”.69
 Such imprecise information about British policy was very frustrating, but reflected 
the genuine uncertainty about how British policy in the Baltic might evolve. In his 
recollections, Siliņš commented that talk of British support which emerged from his 
conversations with McKibbin was “war-time psychological propaganda”, and there was 
more than an element of psychological propaganda in the question of British policy in 
the Baltic in 1944-5.70 From early 1944 onwards it was essential for the British to 
disguise the fact that preparations had begun for the Normandy landings. Under what 
was code named Operation Bodyguard, a whole series of moves were begun designed 
to confuse German intelligence, and the memoirs of Cielēns suggest that one of these 
moves was widely discussed among the Foreign Delegation in Sweden. Cielēns recalled 
that in 1943 the “English General Staff drew up a strategic plan which envisaged an 
Anglo-American military advance through Finland to the Baltic States”.71 Two decades 
after the event this appears to be a garbled memory of one element of Operation 
Bodyguard, Operation Graffam, a supposed plan for an Allied invasion of Norway, that 
would be quickly followed up by a march through neutral Sweden and an assault on 
Denmark. As far as the Swedish press was concerned, Operation Graffam was a 
success: Stockholm newspapers were agreed in summer 1944 that Allied action was 
imminent.  
 Even after the D-Day landings had begun, German intelligence accepted that 
Scandinavia “was considered to be an area of extreme importance in the forthcoming 
operations” and that action against Denmark was “a certainty”.72  Just before the 
Normandy landings, the British ambassador had been instructed on 5 June 1944 that he 
should give the impression “that this invasion is only one of several assaults upon the 
continent”,73 and Operation Graffam made clear that “after D Day, and for as long as 
possible, the enemy should be led to believe that the operations in Norway and Sweden 
will be carried out as soon as sufficient shipping is available, the assault on Denmark 
being postponed until spring 1945”. This was not just the fantasy of psychological 
warfare, however. Operation Graffam envisaged that “if there is any weakening of the 
German forces in Norway, these operations will be launched on a reduced scale to take 
immediate advantage of the situation”; and in August 1944 Churchill asked Stalin if six 
British submarines could be sent to the Baltic via the White Sea Canal.74  In such 
circumstances McKibbin and his fellow intelligence officers were almost bound to give 
confusing information, presumably assuming by October 1944 that there was little sign 
of a German withdrawal from Norway, meaning no action in Denmark until the spring. 
Yet in mid November, precisely when the LCP craved greater clarity, both British and 
German diplomats in Stockholm believed that Sweden was preparing to break off 
diplomatic relations with Germany and enter the war on the Allied side. On 15 November 
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“the desirability of an advance naval base in Sweden” was being discussed within the 
Admiralty.75
 The last advice Kurelis received from Sweden amounted to “do what you can”. 
He already saw his choice as one between immediate insurrection and partisan warfare, 
one of Jaunzeme’s last proposals before leaving for Sweden was to suggest to a colonel 
sympathetic to the LCP that he try to persuade Kurelis’s men to go underground.76 It 
was at this time that Ģinters asked Pēteris Samsons to make contact with Kurelis; 
Samsons had been instructed to organize a partisan movement that would lie low and 
then prepare for an armed struggle against Soviet power at the first opportunity, with 
the help of Sweden, England and America.77 Early in November 1944 the Kurelis group 
informed Sweden that Upelnieks had had a meeting to discuss the work of partisans and 
a subsequent report noted that “our partisan work in the Bolshevik rear continues”.78
 In the end, it was the Germans who resolved Kurelis’s dilemma.  On 14 
November Kurelis was arrested and 1,360 of his men disarmed. 79 Yet as The Times 
report of 19 January 1945 made clear, the Kurelis troops put up a stiff resistance and 
inflicted serious casualties on those sent against them. The remnants of the Kurelis 
organization reported to Sweden shortly after the arrest of Kurelis, “our partisan work in 
the Bolshevik rear is continuing”; earlier it had been reported that “Lt. Sture is based in 
the Zlēķas forest”. Indeed, messages from Kurzeme in the immediate aftermath of the 
Kurelis debacle stressed that “the Kurelis group is continuing its struggle further, with 
losses on both sides: please send further instructions”. On 28 November 1944 Bīleskalns 
sent a report to Siliņš on the situation in Kurzeme: the struggle was continuing; the 
Kurelis men were still engaged in heavy fighting with the German police and needed 
ammunition and moral support, while those in the forest needed arms and logistical 
support to ensure their further work from secure bunkers.80
 
The LCP and the Struggle o  the National Partisans f
 
The arrest of Kurelis was a bitter blow to the LCP. Partisan warfare against the Red 
Army was now clearly the only option, but not all future partisans had been forced into 
the forests. By February 1945 what remained of the LCP military organization in 
Kurzeme could report that there was still a lot of support for the idea of proclaiming the 
restoration of Latvian sovereignty. They had 2,000 nationalist partisans operating in 
units dispersed in Kurzeme, and there were some partisans still operating in Latgale and 
nearby areas, although they were short of munitions and did not always have the 
support of the local population in Russian speaking areas.81 Nevertheless, even at the 
lowest point in their activities, December 1944, thirteen national partisan groups were 
active in Soviet Latvia, and by February 1945 they were undertaking offensive 
operations in groups 70 plus strong.82 By end of March 1945 one of the best organized 
national partisan groups comprised over 350 men scattered in over twenty separate 
bunkers in the Stampaki Marshes; this group was strong enough to engage the Red 
Army on 2-3 March 1945 in two days of heavy fighting.83  
 The problem was whether the national partisan fighting in Kurzeme and 
elsewhere had any international significance or not. After all, the message from “the 
English Secret Service” had been that British military operations in the Baltic could be 
expected in April-May. The disappointing reply, which came in February by radio from 
Stockholm, was that the struggle in Kurzeme was only of significance to the Germans. 
As the Second World War neared its end, there was no likelihood of the landings taking 
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place in Denmark which had been envisaged as part of Operation Graffam. The radio 
message stated: “Latvian units should be preserved at all cost. However long the 
Russian occupation drags on, the partisans should not actively take the stage, but 
should develop and broaden the organization of their future work and preserve their 
strength. Urgently dispatch this information to the others”.84  
 This same message was brought on 5 March 1945 when Arnītis again arrived in 
Kurzeme. Before leaving Sweden, Arnītis had a long briefing meeting with General 
Tepfers, who assessed the situation and how further underground work could be carried 
out in Latvia. As Arnītis told his Soviet interrogators: the reality was that the Germans 
had lost the war and the Russians would occupy the whole of Latvia. “The international 
situation was such that it was unsuitable for staging an immediate armed uprising and 
to start a struggle against Soviet power and for a democratic republic; therefore we 
should develop in the rear of the Red Army, underground nationalist activity, or as 
Tepfers expressed it, ‘a struggle of ideas’, in order to preserve the forces of Latvian 
nationalists and increase recruitment for the organization of new members. Tepfers 
added that before the Russians arrived in Kurzeme the basis had to be laid for that work 
and establish contacts with the LCP centre in Sweden so that “the centre could lead the 
illegal anti-Soviet activity in Latvia from abroad”.85  In the middle of March Dišlers picked 
up the same message: groups should continue to be formed behind Soviet lines, but 
when the Red Army arrived in Kurzeme, there should be no armed action without an 
order.86  
 On 8 May, as the Second World War came to an end and those German forces 
still in Kurzeme prepared to surrender, the last boat for Sweden took Ģinters to safety. 
Arnītis, at the helm of that last boat, was interned by the Swedish authorities on his 
return. From internment he wrote to his contact in Swedish intelligence urging him to 
send a final radio message to Kurzeme reminding LCP partisans not to undertake any 
armed opposition to the Red Army until instructed to do so. He sent this message “to 
remind them one more time of this, in accordance with Tepfers’s instructions.” 87 As the 
summer developed, the majority of national partisans in Latvia became increasingly 
impatient with the idea of awaiting instructions from abroad. With rumours flying around 
that the British were about to land, or had even landed on the Kurzeme shore, the 
activities of the national partisans intensified. By the end of May 30% of village soviets 
in Abrene district had ceased to operate because of national partisan activity; in Ilūkste 
district in June 1945 and the first ten days of July, 32 soviet representatives were killed; 
throughout Daugavpils district telephone lines were down and large tracts of forest 
under national partisan control.88 The national partisans in Latgale and neighbouring 
Ilūkste were busy trying to weld their units together into a grouping they called the 
Second Division; the First Division was the designation given to the forces in Kurzeme, 
while there were plans for a Third Division in Vidzeme. When rumours began again at 
the end of September that the British had landed, preparations began for a nationwide 
insurrection: not only were members of future national and district administrations 
identified, but political pronouncements were hastily translated into English.89  
 Such developments were of great concern to the LCP leadership abroad, but 
what influence could it bring to bear? At the end of the war, McKibbin returned briefly to 
London, but early in July he was back in Stockholm with instructions to see if exploiting 
the LCP network in Latvia might produce information of interests to SIS about 
developments in the Soviet Union.90 McKibbin worked with Tepfers, Ģinters, and Cielēns 
to get suitable members of the LCP network released from Swedish internment. By mid 
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July Ģinters had persuaded the Swedish authorities to release Arnītis and he at once 
made contact with Tepfers and Cielēns about returning to Latvia to do what he could to 
reconstruct the LCP network. When Arnītis visited Cielēns, the latter said, according to 
Arnītis’s statement to Soviet interrogators:  
In the near future, disagreements are hardly likely to arise between the Allies . . 
.  we must prepare for the future. Armed struggle by the Latvian people against 
Soviet power at the present time would, in Cielēns’s opinion, only be harmful and 
would lead to nothing, as every armed incident Soviet power would crush 
immediately. We must, Cielēns said, organise a ‘struggle of ideas’ against Soviet 
power, broaden the ranks of the nationalists and gather together their forces; 
going deep underground, this illegal-anti-Soviet work should be led be the centre 
abroad. 
In August Arnītis met Tepfers who repeated the same message, as did Ģinters.91
 It was not until early October that a four-man team was ready to sail. Arnītis 
would be accompanied by Jānis Šmits, a close friend from school and university days, 
and Eduards Andersons, with whom he had worked regularly during the war; the fourth 
member of the group Laimons Pētersons was an expert with motors. They were 
supposed to set sail on the night of 9-10 October, but there were no less than three 
false starts, and in the end they were forced to turn back because of engine trouble. 
Until this point Swedish intelligence had been willing to provide a radio, but the chaotic 
start to the operation convinced them that it was doomed, so the radio was confiscated 
and the team told to recover one of the radios left behind before the German 
capitulation. The team finally set off on the night of the 12th and arrived on the 14th at 6 
a.m. after their engine had definitively died a little way off shore. This necessitated an 
immediate change of plan. Andersons and Pētersons were supposed to drop Arnītis and 
Šmits, return to Sweden, and then cross back to pick them up, making their first 
attempt on 27 October and returning on 10 November if that rendez-vous was missed. 
Now they had no choice but to bury the boat and all go ashore.92
 The four men headed for a secret “drop” where details of how to make further 
contact were supposed to be hidden. They neared the drop on 16 October and 
Andersons and Pētersons hid in a barn while Arnītis and Šmits made their approach. At 
the drop they found nothing, so decided to make their way to the farm of a friend. On 
the way they were stopped by a local Soviet militiaman. Swedish intelligence had 
provided them with papers, but Arnītis had decided that they were such poor forgeries 
that it was better not to carry them and left the papers, with their guns, at the drop; 
they thus had no papers to present to the militia and were arrested.93 Once Andersons 
and Pētersons realized that something was wrong, they made their own attempt to 
establish contact, which this time was successful.94 Mežaks and Priedītis had survived 
from the wartime operations and Mežaks organized the transfer of Andersons and 
Pētersons to Riga and then joined them there on 28 October. The next day they met up 
with Priedītis and held a meeting to reconstruct the LCP leadership.95 It was agreed: 1) 
to establish a LCP cell in Riga; 2) to make contact with the national partisans; 3) to 
develop an underground press; and 4) to collect information about the numbers of 
Latvian being exiled to Siberia. Andersons reported on the situation in Sweden and 
Mežaks reported on the situation in Latvia.96  
 Unfortunately, as Andersons and Pētersons tried to get their boat repaired for 
the return journey, they were arrested and the whole LCP cell crumbled. Both Mežaks 
and Priedītis were arrested, but before his arrest, Priedītis had succeeded in making 
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contact with someone in touch with the Vidzeme partisans97, and on 7 December a 
group of Vidzeme partisans listened to instructions received “from the British Secret 
Service” which told them “until the moment when foreign states intervene to restore the 
independence of the Baltic States by force of arms, be passive in your attitude to the 
Soviet authorities, preserve your lives and organisation and wait for instructions from 
abroad to begin active operations”.98 Without the prospect of British support, the LCP 
felt it had no choice but to put the activity of its national partisans on hold.99
 
Unjustly Forgotten? 
 
The LCP, like Operation Graffam on which the LCP uprising depended for success, 
quickly sank into post-war obscurity; after all, for all the LCP’s grandiose ambitions, it 
failed to influence the fate of Latvia. Its story would never be told by Soviet 
commentators – they always insisted that the LCP, unlike Latvia’s Soviet partisans, had 
never taken up arms against the Germans, but had simply prevaricated and issued 
meaningless bits of paper. Within Latvia’s émigré community a similar view quickly 
emerged, but from the opposite end of the political spectrum. Over the summer of 1945 
the relatively small Latvian emigration associated with the LCP boat transports to 
Sweden was overtaken in terms of numbers by survivors from the Latvian Legion 
interned in Germany. As a result, even at the time of Arnītis’s last mission, the LCP could 
no longer speak for the whole Latvian emigration. Justifying their own decision to fight 
Soviet communism by forming a pragmatic alliance with Hitler, former legionaries were 
able to convince most émigrés that their amoral pragmatism had nearly succeeded, 
while the idealists of the LCP had never stood a chance. Once the Cold War was firmly 
established, the “third way” offered by the LCP held little of interest. 
 Since the restoration of Latvia’s independence, echoes of this émigré controversy 
have been reflected in Latvian historiography. The basic outlines of the LCP story are 
now well-known, and Konstantīns Čakste is revered by many; but even reputable 
historians like Uldis Neiburgs continue to suggest that the LCP activists were deluded in 
their fanciful belief that Britain would come to Latvia’s aid; in his view their escapades 
should not be taken seriously. The picture is truly alarming when it comes to popular 
history. Glossy picture books extol the virtues of the Latvian Legion, and websites 
peddle pseudo-documentary films which state clearly that the Latvian Legion was 
fighting for Latvian independence, ignoring the fact that Hitler never agreed even to 
Latvian autonomy and only gave Bangerskis permission to form a government in March 
1945. Soldiers in the Latvian Legion wanted independence, no doubt, but they were 
fighting for Hitler.100  
 There have been two weak points in the LCP’s story which Latvian historians 
sympathetic to its cause have failed to challenge. First, the LCP was not just a liberal 
talking shop as Soviet commentators tried to suggest, and Latvian public opinion still 
seems to accept. As the evidence presented here shows, although its leading activists 
were the “wishy washy pinko” elite of Latvia’s parliamentary establishment from the 
1920s and early 1930s, they succeeded in establishing a formidable underground 
organization linked to fighting units operating throughout the country; the national 
partisans who fought side by side with Soviet partisans in spring 1944 were reading 
Jaunā Latvija edited by Cielēns.101
 Second, the LCP’s strategy of linking up with the British in order to prepare an 
insurrection co-ordinated with a British landing was rooted in fact, not fiction. Critics of 
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the LCP have always been able to laugh off these efforts on the grounds that the British 
never had any intention of landing in the Baltic, and the few Britons who talked in this 
way were SIS officers like Harry Carr who were working to an intelligence agenda and 
were prepared to promise anything and con anyone in the hope of acquiring a network 
which would enable them to place British agents inside the Soviet Union. Again, the 
evidence produced above shows quite clearly that the option of a Baltic operation by the 
British was always on the cards, but depended on the speed of Germany’s collapse. If 
the Warsaw Uprising had succeeded, intervention in the Baltic in November 1944 was 
likely. If the Germans had not staged their Ardennes counter-offensive in December 
1944, German collapse might have begun in the early spring, making British operations 
in the Baltic in April-May quite feasible. The LCP was not conned, its strategy made 
absolute sense, but the vicissitudes of war meant their moment passed. 
 With Latvia re-established as a democratic state within the European Union, it is 
surely important to recover this episode in the history of that country’s democratic 
movement, so that students both in Latvia and beyond its borders know that in the 
struggle between the two totalitarian systems of the twentieth century, defending the 
country from one by siding with the other was not the only option. The Latvian Legion 
survived to tell its story. The national partisans loyal to the LCP did not. 
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